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ABSTRACT 
 
This case highlights the specific risks and issues that may be encountered in the 
information systems (IS) procurement process in a country where bribery and 
corruption are more common. PSO is a large Indian public sector organization 
involved in energy-related business. Being financially deprived, PSO relied on 
government funding to build its infrastructures. Besides the funding support, PSO 
also inherited the bureaucratic structure and the corruption practices. Lately, PSO 
was involved in several IS infrastructure and applications upgrading projects and 
wanted to review its IS procurement process.  Does PSO understand the process 
risks in public IS procurement? Does PSO have the maturity to implement control 
mechanisms in order to mitigate its IS procurement process risks? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This case of a public sector organization (PSO) in India highlights the specific risks 
and issues that may be encountered in the information systems (IS) procurement 
process in a country where bribery and corruption are more common. India’s 
corruption is no different from other developing countries. Initially when the British 
ruled India, there were rampant corruption practices among the British Government 
officials in India (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). When India gained independence, she 
faced the challenge of creating a brand new nation.  Companies are increasingly 
alarmed about corruption practices in India. According to a recent report on 
outsourcing (Maclver, 2008): "The Indian outsourcing industry, struggling with 
geopolitical threats, decreased global spending and protectionist pressures, has 
been hit with severe credibility issues and scandal. Outsourcing buyers are now 
keenly aware they can no longer justify offshore cost savings.” 
 
PSO is a large India public sector organization involved in energy-related business 
and relied on government funding to build its infrastructures. Besides the funding 
support, PSO also inherited the bureaucratic structure and the corruption practices. 
IS procurement risks are acute for public sector organizations mainly because of 
extensive red tape (Braa et al., 2004) and widespread corruption (Walsham and 
Sahay, 1999) in the public procurement process. Lately, PSO was involved in 
several IS infrastructure and applications upgrading projects and wanted to review its 
IS procurement process.  Does PSO understand the process risks in public IS 
procurement? What are the control mechanisms that are present or missing in 
PSO’s IS procurement process? Does PSO have the maturity to implement control 
mechanisms in order to mitigate its IS procurement process risks? 
 
IS PROCUREMENT PROCESS RISKS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 
 
“State of California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)’s project in 
the mid-1990s to switch nearly 70 million vehicle, license, and 
identification records from a legacy system to a new sophisticated 
database system was both behind schedule and over budget. One of 
the main reasons why the DMV project failed is due to the procurement 
restrictions of the organization’s commitment to a specific hardware 
platform and overlooking all other available platforms. As a result of the 
failure, California State Department’s information technology 
procurement process has since adopted greater control and oversight. 
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In general, public sector organizations are considered large consumers 
of information technology. As such information technology procurement 
becomes critical in these organizations. However, as the California 
DMV failure amply demonstrates, conducting information technology 
procurement in public sector is not easy and the risks are daunting”2. 
 
One of the main challenges that public information technology (IT) managers face 
today is procurement of IS, i.e. hardware and software. In general, IS procurement is 
said to be more challenging than the procurement of other goods and services due 
mainly to IS’s complex requirements (Saarinen and Vepsäläinen, 1994) and the 
limited availability of IT suppliers (Press, 1996). 
 
An IS procurement process encompasses several activities: forming the 
procurement committee, specifying hardware/software requirement, identifying the 
vendor, launching a competitive tender program, issuing a purchase order, and 
receiving the IS products and services. Figure 1 summarizes these IS procurement 
activities in public sector and their prevalent risks. An IS procurement process 
usually begins with user departments identifying their needs for information systems. 
The purchase requisitions are routed by workflow for procuring by authorized 
purchasing personnel. Once approved, IS procurement activities are carried out by a 
procurement committee which is made up of IT specialists, procurement personnel 
and representatives of the users. Potential risks at this initial phase may include: a 
lack of common goals among procurement committee members (Pan et al., 2006), 
committee members are inadequately equipped with skills and experiences in IS 
procurement and contracting, and obscure authorization structure. For example, 
unclear authorization structure may pose a problem since decision structure may 
determine who the decision makers are. In a centralized organizational structure, the 
IT or procurement department may be the decision makers. In contrast, in a de-
centralized structure, user departments are authorized to decide over the choice and 
source of information systems. 
                                                 
2
 Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, State University of 
New York, Making Smart IT Choices: Understanding Value and Risk in Government 
IT Investments, http://www.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/smartit2?chapter=3. 
Last accessed 19th December 2010. 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest 2012 
 126
Figure 1: IS Procurement Process Activities and their Respective Process Risks 
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At the ‘specify hardware/software requirement’ phase, the main issue surrounds 
conflicts among the IS procurement committee members over system design and 
requirements. Conflicts may arise owing to frequent system design change 
requests that may become unmanageable. Potential risks at this phase may 
include specifying unnecessary/inadequate requirements, purchasing software of 
inferior quality, and the presence of a misfit between the client’s requirements 
and the system’s features (Mamghani, 2000). The next phase of the IS 
procurement process involves identifying a set of appropriate vendors. This can 
be accomplished by publicly advertising for vendors or approaching selected 
vendors privately. The potential risks in this phase include a cultural misfit 
between clients and vendor (Kern et al., 2002), a client’s inability to monitor and 
control the vendor’s progress, having vendors that lack adequate implementation 
experience (Mamghani, 2000), and finally, the vendor’s inability to provide 
support after the implementation.  
 
Once the decisions concerning which IS products or services to acquire are 
made, other than the occasional direct negotiations with preferred vendors, 
typically the purchasing contract is awarded through a competitive tender 
program. A competitive tender program is the process of selecting and 
contracting a preferred provider from a range of potential contractors by seeking 
tenders for the provision of specified outcomes and evaluating these on the basis 
of a set of agreed criteria (Adams and Reader, 2000). A competitive tender 
program is widely adopted in IS procurement within the public sector whereas it 
is less common in private sector organizations. Competitive tender program is 
preferred to direct negotiations because of the belief that it ensures fair and open 
competition. While the lowest cost appears to be the main decision criterion, 
some organizations do not necessary select the lowest cost vendor (Cross, 
1995). Other criteria such as product or software quality are often preferred over 
price. At this phase the potential risks include political manipulation of tender 
outcome (Choi, 1999), uncompetitive vendor bid (Chaudhary et al., 1995), bribery 
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and kickbacks, and loss, alteration, or unauthorized disclosure of bidding price 
data. 
 
The next step in the IS procurement process is to issue the purchase order for IS 
products and services. The main risk we identified here is delays in the contract 
offering owing to extensive details such as technical, commercial and economic 
terms, and disagreement among related parties on stated contract terms (Mani et 
al., 2006). A contract usually contains key technical, commercial and economic 
understandings related to the purchase transaction that allocates obligations and 
associated risks to the parties in a legally enforceable manner. A contract is 
useful where there is an absence of mutual trust between the client and 
suppliers. Simply defined, trust entails that a client is confident that a vendor will 
deliver what has been stipulated in a contract, deal with problems, and be fair 
and honest in its charges (Kern and Willcocks, 2000). Sometimes due to 
insufficient trust, delays may arise out of differences among procurement 
committee members, and also between the committee and the shortlisted vendor 
in understanding and agreeing to the obligations stated in the contract. For 
example, disagreements may arise over (a) compensation paid by the 
responsible party in the event it does not manage the assigned risk as required; 
and (b) effective mechanisms established to resolve disputes fairly, within a 
reasonable time period, and at a reasonable cost (Khan and Parra, 2003). The 
last phase in the IS procurement process is to receive IS goods and services. 
Products received are inspected for quality and counted for quantity. The aim 
here is to ensure right products in the correct amount are received in acceptable 
conditions. The potential risks include acceptance of 
unordered/unacceptable/damaged products and services, and errors in counting 
products. 
 
Overall, IS procurement in the public sector may face several process risks and if 
not managed properly, organizations may face severe consequences. The next 
section describes PSO’s IS procurement process. 
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PSO’S IS PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
 
PSO is a large India public sector organization involved in energy-related 
business. Given that this is a critical industry, the India Government set up a 
Vigilance Committee (VC) to monitor PSO’s business operation. VC was an 
external entity that served as a process auditor. PSO’s business would require 
the use of advanced technology such as supercomputers and software 
platforms. Lately, PSO was involved in several IT infrastructure (e.g., Storage 
Area Networks) and applications (e.g., Virtual Reality) upgrading projects. These 
changes provided the opportunity to explore PSO’s IS procurement process. 
 
The purchasing process would usually involve a call for tender. In total, there are 
three types of tender: open, limited and nomination. All vendors could participate 
in open tenders but only a selected group would be involved in limited tenders. 
As for nomination tenders, PSO would issue ‘Request for Proposal’ to a single 
vendor. The third option was rarely used as it would appear difficult to justify to 
the VC why only one vendor was shortlisted in the selection process. For open 
and limited tenders, vendors had to attend pre-bid meetings to discuss PSO’s 
tender specifications. A Tender Committee (TC) that consisted of the Finance 
Department, the Procurement Department, IS Department and the User 
Departments would usually be set up to evaluate vendors’ specifications and 
ensure they were consistent with PSO’s requirements. PSO’s IS procurement 
process is summarized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: PSO’s IS Procurement Process 
 
The bidding process involved two phases. The first phase aimed at addressing 
the technical specifications of the IT solution. In this round, vendors were allowed 
only a single opportunity to seek technical clarification. After which, successful 
vendors would advance to the next phase. In the second phase, all vendors’ 
quotations were made transparent. Those who did not succeed in the prior stage 
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became eye-witnesses in this phase. A constant challenge in the procurement 
process was the users’ inability to produce precise a priori software 
specifications. As a result, they had to artificially produce the specifications based 
on vendors’ specifications to create competition. According to a PSO’s 
operational manager: 
 
“The problem is it has to be satisfied in totality…they have to 
match verbatim. But users don’t always know what the exact 
system specifications are going to look like. So users would take 
3 vendors’ specifications and artificially create requirements by 
marrying all 3 specifications. These artificial requirements create 
enough competition for those three vendors, and then these 
specifications have to match exactly in order to select the 
vendor…Suppose you are procuring RISC workstation which 
has a smaller frequency than your regular Intel. Suppose IBM 
has 100 MHz, vendor A has 90 and vendor B has 80. So in my 
specs I would write 90 MHZ, - in which case I won’t get the best 
product (i.e., IBM with frequency 100 MHz). If I had written 100 
in my specs, I would have got only one quotation - from IBM, 
which will look as if I am favoring the vendor. Then they will 
make me re-tender because they want competition! This whole 
re-tender causes substantial delay.” 
 
Another operational manager also explained: 
 
“PSO makes a fundamental assumption that to buy something 
you have to know exactly what you want. And when you write 
the specifications, they become ‘holy’. This requires a priori 
knowledge of what we really need, which can be rather 
impossible. It’s a strange paradox. Developed economies 
usually use ‘Front End Engineering Design’ where they provide 
broad guidelines and requirements, and vendors do the exact 
specifications to fit the broader needs.” 
 
One consequence that might arise from the current practice is the danger of 
seeing the product price as more important than the product quality (i.e., quality 
of technology). For example, when all competing vendors (e.g., A, B and IBM) 
met the technical criteria (i.e., frequency of RISC processor) given by PSO, they 
would be evaluated solely on price. In this particular scenario, vendor A turned 
out to be the lowest price bidder who put in a frequency of 90 MHz as compared 
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with IBM’s 100 MHz. Given the more attractive pricing, vendor A was selected 
even though its technology quality was inferior to IBM’s. 
 
According to PSO’s tender regulation, vendors can lodge an appeal if they 
deemed the vendor selection partial. Unfortunately, some vendors abused this 
privilege by lobbying against PSO’s vendor of choice, using software 
specifications as a rhetorical tool; they argued that corruption was rampant and 
had played a major role in biasing PSO’s vendor selection decision process: 
 
“Since the bidding system is open, everyone knows what the 
bids are – Vendor A will complain that B doesn’t match the 
specifications in order to force a re-tender and B will complain 
that A doesn’t match the specifications too. This is all done to 
get the contract – neither A nor B actually care whether 
specifications match or don’t. One vendor told me “Sir, how 
does this affect us? We just have to write a letter”. These 
complaints are particularly launched against vendors who are 
expected to bid a very low price” (Group General Manager, 
PSO). 
 
The delays from the appeal process can be very costly to all 
parties: 
 
“As a vendor, I have been making a lot of effort to meet 
everything on the specifications - then some minor obscure 
items are not on the specifications, and the other [losing] vendor 
starts to write the letter…… 
7 years ago PSO decided to acquire some systems. It was 
approved by the board. The competitor decided to write a letter 
to fight the process. It’s been 7 years and it’s not been procured 
to date. Basically PSO had lost all values from IT” (Regional IT 
Manager, Vendor B). 
 
On many occasions, PSO faced a dilemma of whether it ought to address 
vendors’ complaints by allowing a re-tender or refuse vendors’ appeals and be 
subject to possible investigation by VC. The predicament proved to be a thorny 
issue because re-tender would lengthen and possibly delay the IS procurement 
process. But by disallowing re-tendering, PSO had to face the VC’s investigation 
which could potentially affect its reputation: 
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“We want to go with that particular vendor even though there is 
no competing vendor. We believe that vendor provides the best 
product and best value for money” – however nobody dares to 
take this stand – because you can be seen as favoring that 
vendor – and then “vigilance case ban jayega” [it will become a 
vigilance case (translated from Hindi)]. In fact, for that IT 
solution, which involved a 50 [million Rupees] [1 million Rupees 
= 22391 USD] contract, the argument was over a component, 
that cost only [100,000 rupees]! (Head of Information 
Processing Group, PSO). 
 
According to another operational manager: 
 
“We followed the rules and regulations very closely. All of 
us have phobia towards the VC. They identify slight 
deviation from the normal tender rules as a case of 
corruption, in that we might be favoring a particular vendor. 
The VC pays great attention to the rules, because they 
believe ‘checks and balances’ are necessary to prevent 
common corrupt practices where a vendor could indeed 
give bribes to PSO to ensure that (a) it will be selected to 
supply the solution or (b) once selected its product 
shipment would rapidly pass the quality assurance 
checks.” 
 
Nevertheless, by carrying out re-tenders regularly this might affect the long term 
vendor-client relationship. According to the CEO of Vendor B: 
“For transparency, PSO has a process in place but it wants the 
best product at the cheapest price. That’s a flawed logic. We do 
not have a good relationship with them. PSO is like our 
‘adversary’. Any client-vendor relationship has to be a win-win 
relationship.” 
 
Despite its potential shortcoming, re-tender (and dealing with consequential 
delays) was often viewed as the lesser of the two evils. In fact, a transparent 
tender process was seen as more important than procuring better quality 
applications simply to ward off VC’s possible intervention and investigation. 
According to PSO’s Group General Manager: 
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“There is a perfect example of how accepting B’s bid made 
sense on both technical and economic grounds, but since the 
Tender Committee was under surveillance by the VC, they 
followed the rules to the letter and re-tendered. A 1-man enquiry 
was set up, and the retired gentleman acquitted these people 
(who wrote the specs). But this took a very long time, during 
which they went through so much trauma and public humiliation. 
Worse still, the CEO refused the recommendations of this 1-
man enquiry claiming that one of the defendants turned 
emotional while being interrogated, so the enquiry is not 
legitimate.” 
 
Vendors’ appeals often caused the IS procurement process to be delayed by a 
long time and as a consequence, IT solutions became outdated when they were 
eventually procured. According to PSO’s Group General Manager: 
 
“For example, we hired Vendor C to offer us a storage 
[networking] solution. After the order was placed, a networking 
switch went out of production. A replacement for this switch 
would require side stepping the normal tendering process, 
resulting in possible investigation by the VC. Vendor C has to 
prove that another solution exists, which will pass the technical 
level and which won’t be more expensive than the previous 
solution. If it is at a lower price, then the savings have to be 
passed to us. However, if the new solution turns out to be better 
than the previous one, the vendor gets no credit for it.” 
 
Furthermore, vendors were expected to strictly adhere to the procurement 
procedures: 
 
“PSO’s procedures are cast in stone. Vendors have to live with 
them. Chances of process changing based on vendors’ 
recommendations are low” (CEO, Vendor A).  
 
“We would like to change the rules, but who is going to bell the 
cat (i.e., government)? It’s all about vigilance. PSO is scared of 
VC. Why can't they take a stand? The leaders are so scared to 
stand up to their principles. In fact, there was one exception: 
PSO bought ERP for 10 million Rupees (220,000 USD, 
approximately) - they didn't conduct a tender - they negotiated 
directly with the vendor. The Chairman spearheaded the project. 
So it’s not like it can’t be done.” (Regional Manager, Vendor B). 
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Nevertheless, PSO’s expectations incurred negative consequences. One very 
good example was that PSO would always opt for pricing over quality which had 
impacts on PSO’s long term technological performance: 
 
“This is the height of being so subservient to the process. Last 
year we had given them a choice to use Sun or SGI. It so 
happened that SGI was priced lower than Sun. The platform of 
choice in that industry is Sun. I had made them the offer to 
negotiate Sun's price on their behalf and bring it down to what 
SGI was offering! I would have brought Sun's price down. But 
they didn’t agree – they bought SGI! That’s the height of not 
applying your mind to it - you are so subservient to the process. 
The thought of buying technology [Sun] for the sake of the 
organization doesn't occur to them” (Regional IT Manager, 
Vendor B). 
 
In addition, shipped orders had to be verified and certified by several PSO’s 
departments before sending to users who procure the orders. The verification 
was necessary to uphold ‘checks and balances’ within the procurement process. 
Nevertheless with the involvement of several departments, the likelihood of 
corruption was also increased: 
 
“Now several people become very powerful - Quality Assurance 
(QA), finance etc – since everything has to be verified and 
certified by them. For example, the QA group could deliberately 
delay the shipment on ‘trivial’ grounds such as the shipment 
label did not match the customer order information specified in 
the tender specifications. QA inspectors are either genuinely 
worried about the paperwork not matching the tender or getting 
caught by VC. Vendors may have to bribe QA to obtain 
approval. However this is not all. Bribes may also have to be 
offered to the Finance group to speed up the payment process” 
(Operational manager, PSO). 
 
Overall, PSO’s IS procurement process can be said to involve several key 
stakeholders such as the VC, Indian Government, vendors, auditors, and even 
the legal profession and the media. Figure 3 describes the stakeholders who 
would play an influential role in PSO’s process governance and control activities. 
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Figure 3: PSO’s Circle of Governance and Control 
 
Acknowledging its shortcomings in the IS procurement process, PSO conducted 
a review exercise to identify process risks, control weaknesses and examine 
what controls could be enacted to improve its IS procurement process: 
 
“Several improvements were needed to shore up PSO’s existing IS 
procurement process and they were introduced one-by-one. For 
example, PSO allowed regular direct negotiations with vendors in 
some key transactions; granted more authority to user groups; 
minimized the involvement of the Finance and Procurement 
Departments during the bidding process; included broader 
specifications in tenders and allowed more rounds of clarifications 
from vendors; and ranked vendors based on ‘value-for-money’ 
rather than ‘lowest-cost’ criterion” (Operational Manager, PSO). 
 
“In addition, PSO initiated several communications with VC to 
understand the monitoring and auditing policies better and at the 
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practices. It is hoped that with more communication and 
understanding, the fear may be reduced. Furthermore, the 
company also drafted a new set of guidelines on accepting 
business gifts – stating clearly what are considered acceptable 
business gifts and what are considered bribes” (Group General 
Manager, PSO). 
 
“Like some developed economies, we should not have a binary 
evaluation of the vendor – we should rank them in absolute value in 
terms of the benefits they provide. You can have an expert group 
performing these evaluations, or a 3rd party consulting group. The 
emphasis should be on value-add, not on lowest-cost bidder. I 
suggest a parameter called Value for Money, where you divide the 
absolute value in terms of the benefit they provide/ Price of bid. You 
can ask the highest value vendor to match the vendor that provides 
the best value for money – that way you might get the best quality 
at the lowest price! If the highest value vendor does not match the 
offer, you select the vendor that provides good value for money” 
(Head of Information Processing Group, PSO). 
 
PSO’s vendors drew comparisons between their public sector clients in India and 
overseas: 
“In India, the corruption is centered on financial/legal and not 
technical. In other countries… the US trusts the technical people 
more. They are more empowered. They are able to justify their 
decision with far less paperwork and less time. But the large 
difference is that they have more trust and faith in the technical 
personnel than the Indian Government in PSO’s technical experts. 
Generally vendors do not get in touch with Procurement/Finance 
departments. Everything is based on a single point of contact. 
Unlike in PSO, the Procurement guys are very much involved in the 
entire procurement process” (Regional Manager, Vendor A). 
 
The next section proposes a IS procurement process control maturity model to 
assist in assessing the level of control maturity in PSO’s IS procurement process. 
 
IS PROCUREMENT PROCESS CONTROL MATURITY 
 
The alarming frequency of process failures has raised organizations’ awareness 
in enacting process control as they become more responsible and mature 
towards governing business processes (Weill, 2004). Furthermore the current 
financial turmoil and uncertain business environment is pushing organizations to 
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improve firm-wide risk management, cultivate a risk-aware culture and instill 
stronger process governance. Despite the urgency, implementing control is 
neither easy nor intuitive (Kettinger et al., 1997).  On the one hand, a lack of 
control may raise the level of threats within the IS procurement process. On the 
other hand, excessive control may lead to control redundancy and a decline in 
operational efficiency. Furthermore, even if public sector organizations are willing 
to implement control, they may still lack the preparedness and maturity to 
implement control mechanisms. A control maturity model is useful to provide a 
roadmap for organizations who may want to implement control mechanisms in 
their IS procurement processes.  Figure 4 describes a control maturity model 
which captures the progressive levels of preparedness needed to implement and 
manage IS procurement process control. 
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Figure 4:  IS Procurement Process Control Maturity Model3 
 
                                                 
3
 The model is inspired by the work of Capability Maturity Model for Software (Humphrey, 1989) and de-escalation 
management maturity model by Flynn et al. (in press).  
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- Effectiveness of experiential-based learning 
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-Effectiveness of rigorous control techniques. E.g., tracked 
purchased software, conduct internal control assessment, conduct 
periodic control audits, engage IS purchasing process consultant, 
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-Effectiveness of communication channels 
-Existence of risk assessment exercise 
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Control redundancy and inadequacy are common features for organizations in level 1 of 
the CM model. These organizations lack planning and do not have proper coordination 
implementing controls. Often, their implementation of controls tends to be on an ad-hoc 
basis. 
 
Organizations must set up a IS procurement process control implementation strategy 
and chart overall control direction to help IS procurement process to achieve objectives. 
Here details about short, medium and long term process control strategy should be 
clearly spelled out. For example in the long run, ‘very damaging’ category of risk should 
be completely eliminated. Or the organization may specify residual risks (i.e., risks that 
remain after controls have been implemented) to be set at 30%, 20% and 10% for short 
term, medium term and long term scenarios. Organizations that plan and chart overall 
process control direction reached level 2 of the CM model. 
Organizations should design overall IS procurement control policies and procedures 
that demonstrate an organization’s commitment to the importance of control. 
Organizations must design a sophisticated process control environment that 
encourages open communication which relates to process weakness. For example 
creating a feedback forum or even regular workshops to inform about key changes in 
the IS procurement policies and procedures. Organizations that lack a sophisticated 
control environment have not yet reached level 3 of the CM model. 
 
Organizations must embrace process control management tools and techniques that 
allow for detection of anomalies from the desired state of control. For example, tracked 
purchased software (copyright licenses), conduct internal control assessment (control 
matrix), conduct periodic control audits, engage IS purchasing process consultant, 
engage forensic specialists, and implement a fraud/bribery hotline. Rigorous detection 
of process flaws is the hallmark of level 4 organizations.  Organizations that do not 
employ rigorous control techniques have not yet reached level 4 of the CM model. 
 
Organizations must improve overall control conscious by placing a value on self-
evaluation and developing mechanisms to encourage self-reflection. Experiential-based 
learning needs to be encouraged and facilitated so as to ensure learning from past 
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experiences takes place.  Only in this way will organizations be able to learn from past 
experiences and prevent potential cases of control oversight from occurring.  
Organizations that have not diligently improved control conscious and embraced honest 
self-evaluations have not reached level 5 of the CM model. 
Based on the above IS procurement process control maturity model, what is the control 
maturity level of PSO’s IS procurement process?  How high does PSO rate in its level of 
control maturity?  What are the control mechanisms that are present or missing in 
PSO’s IS procurement process?  Is PSO prepared to minimize risks in it’s IS 
procurement process? 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The potential disruption of IS procurement process due to the presence of process risks 
coupled with inadequate controls has negative impacts on organizations’ operations and 
may even affect organizational objectives.  This case highlights the specific risks that 
may be encountered in a public IS procurement process.  There are many key issues to 
consider as PSO reviewed its IT procurement process.  Does PSO understand the 
process risks in public IS procurement? Does PSO have the maturity to implement 
control mechanisms in order to mitigate its IS procurement process risks? 
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